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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 




BALL·ARD-W AD·E, INC., Err' .AJL,. 
Defendants-Appellants 
No.10245 
This is a civil suit brought by an insurancH com-
pany on a theory of absolute liability to recover from 
the lessees amounts expended by the insurance com-
pany in repairing fire damage to the leased premises. 
DJ.SPOISI1TION IN 'THE LOWER ICO·URT 
The lower court ruled that as a matter of law the 
lease imposed absolute liability on the lessees and, ac-
cordingly, limited the non-jury trial solely to the ques-
tion of amount of damages. Judgment was awarded 
the insurance company in the amount of $4,200. 
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RE·LIEF SOUGHT ON AP'PEAL 
The appellants seek a reversal of the judgment 
below and a remand with instructions to enter judgment 
in their favor against the insurance company, or in the 
alternative, a new trial. 
·The Patricia Graff Trust (called lessor), not a party 
to this action, leased certain premises in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to the defendants-appellants (called lessee). (R. 
13) There was a substitution of parties to the lease, not 
material to this controv€rsy. (R.13) 
During the term of the lease, a fire occurred on the 
premises. (R. 13) 'The lessor assured the lessee that 
insurance would take care of the repair. (R. 120) No 
de·mand or request was made upon the lessee to repair 
the damage, the lessor making all arrangements for the 
repair. (R. 119) Plaintiff-respondent, New Hampshire 
Insurance Company, (called insurance company) caused 
repairs to be effected. ( R. 13) 
Over a year and a half later, the insurance company 
initiated this action against the lessee by a two count 
complaint. The first count sounded in negligence. (R. 1, 
13) The alternative second count was based on the 
theory that one paragraph in the lease (paragraph 8, en-
titled Indemnity) (R. 18) imposed absolute liability as a 
matter of law on the lessee for damage to the premises. 
(R. 2, 14, 57) 
Although the pretrial order would have required a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
finding of negligence against the lessee in order that 
liability be imposed under the second count of the 
complaint (R. 14), on motion of the insurance company 
and before the taking of any evidence, the trial court 
ruled that the indemnity provision of the lease imposed 
absolute liability on the lessee. (R. 22, minute entry; 
R. 58, lines 19-21) 'The trial court determined, at the 
request of the insurance company, that negligence on the 
part of the lessee need not be shown and that the only 
issue which the court would hear was the question of the 
amount of damages. (R. 58, line 21) 
The trial court sustained the insurance company's 
objections to the lessee's offer of proof that the lease was 
drafted by the lessor's attorney, and an offer of proof 
as to the intent of the parties with reference to the ef-
fect of the maintenance provision (paragraph 4) and the 
indemnity provision (paragraph 8) of the lease. (R. 63) 
On motion of the insurance company, its negligence 
count was dismissed without prejudice. (R. 22, minute 
entry; (R. 58) 
After hearing evidence the trial court, sitting with-
out a jury, rendered judgment against the lessee in the 
amount of $4,200. 
T·he parts of the lease, which is set forth in full in the 
record (R. 17-19), relevant to the issues on appeal are: 
. 4. MAINTE.N AN~c·E : . . . Lessee agrees 
~t Its. own ~xpense to maintain all the said prem-
Ises,. Including. roof: exterior, interior, plumbing, 
heating, electrical fixtures and glass in the build-
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4 
ing on said premises in a good and useable condi~ 
tion, and to maintain the hard surfacing of the 
premises in a good and useable condition, and at 
the expiration of this lease or sooner termination 
thereof to surrender said premises in as good con-
dition as when received, ordinary wear and tear, 
unavoidable damage by fire, the elements or other 
casualties excepted. . . . 
8. INDEMNITY: The Lessee will exoner-
ate, save harmless, protect and indemnify Lessor 
from and against any and all losses, damages, 
claims, suits or actions, judgments and costs which 
shall arise or grow out of any injury to or death 
of persons and/ or damage to property, caused by, 
arising from, or in any manner connected with the 
exercise of any right granted or conferred hereby, 
or the use, maintenance, operation and/or repair 
of the said premises, buildings, equipment, ma-
chinery, and appliances thereon, whether sus-
tained by Lessee or Lessor, their respective agents 
or employees or by any other persons or corpo-
rations which seek to hold the Lessor liable. 
ARGUMEIN'T 
POINT I. 
THE T'RIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE Mo-
TION OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY T'HAT, .AJS A MAT-
ER O·F LAW, THE LE.ASE IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABIL-
ITY ON THE LESSEE: 
A. BECAUSE PROPER CO·NSTRUCTION OF THE 
LEASE SH10WS THAT ABSOLUTE LIABILITY WAS 
NO·T IN·TENDED BY T'HE PARTIES. 
It 'vas at the insistence of the insurance company 
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that the trial court ruled that the lease imposed absolute 
liability on the lessee and refused to hear any evidence 
but that bearing solely on the issue of the amount of 
damages. Although the lessee was prepared to litigate 
fully all issues fairly raised by the complaint, the 
insurance company chose to rest its case entirely upon 
the theory that the indemnity provision of the lease 
i1nposed absolute liability on the lessee. It is the lessee's 
contention that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter 
of la'v that the lease in1posed absolute liability on the 
lessee. 
It should be noted that paragraph 4, entitled Main-
tenance, deals with maintenance of the premises and the 
duty of the lessee to the lessor with reference to repair 
and maintenance of the premises by the lessee and the 
conditions, qualifications and exceptions of such require-
nlent. It surely does not impose absolute liability or any 
semblance of it. 
On the other hand, paragraph 8, entitled Indemnity, 
is a broadly drawn provision purporting to provide that 
the lessee will save the lessor harmless from losses aris-
ing out of the use of the premises. While its language 
is not a model of clarity, it is clearly primarily intended 
to protect the lessor from claims of third parties which 
might arise out of the lessee's activity on the leased 
premises. 
A lease is a contract and as such is properly inter-
preted by the long and well established rules of contract 
interpretation. In the interpretation of any contract, the 
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cardinal p-rinciple is that the intent of the parties should 
be ascertained. Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 
51 Utah 78, 168 Pac. 966 (1917). 
The most important rule used in determining thP 
intent of the parties to a written instrument is that the 
instrument should be read as a whole and effect given 
to all of its provisions if possible. Minkoff v. McLean, 
295 P'a. 396, 145 Atl. 534 (1929'). In Neal D. Ivey Co. 
v. Franklin Associates, lnc., 370 Pa. 225, 87 A.2d 236 
( 1952) the court said, at page 239 : 
It is a rule of universal application that in 
construing a contract each and every part of it 
must be taken into consideration and given effect 
if possible, and that the intention of the parties 
must be ascertained from the entire instrument. 
An interpretation will not be given to one part 
of a contract which will annul another part of it. 
It is but logical, sensible and just that a contract 
be construed so that all of its provisions be given effect, 
if possible. Hull v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d 
12.3 ( 19·41) ; Restatement of ~Contracts, § 236 (c). 
Corbin states the rule in the following language: 
If the apparent inconsistency is between a 
clause that is general and broadly inclusive in 
character and one that is more limited and spe-
cific in its coverage, the latter should generally be 
held to operate as a modification and pro tanto 
nullification of the former. 3 ~Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 547, p. 176 (1960). 
The reason for the rule is that the specific provision 
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more exactly states the intention of the parties than the 
broad or general clause. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank 
v. Markha1n, 106 Colo. 509, 107 P.2d 313 (19·40); Smith 
v. Russ, 184 Kan. 773, 339 P.2d 286 (19'59); Wilder v. 
Wilder, 138 'Cal. App.2d 152, 291 P.2d 79 (1955). 
In Smith, supra, one provision of a lease provided 
that the lessee ". . . shall not release or sublease said 
premises, or any portion thereof or assign this lease nor 
shall there be any renewal or extension of the same 
without written consent .... " of the lessor. Another pro-
vision more specifically provided that the lessee " ... has 
the option of extending this lease for an additional five 
( 5) years .... " The court ruled that the specific provision 
would control over the general one to the extent neces-
sary to give effect to the specific provision. 
In Wilder, supra, where one provision purported to 
cover all claims and another purported to cover specific, 
enumerated claims, the court held that the general pro-
vision must give way to the extent needed to accomino-
date the specific provision. 
In the instant controversy, the indemnity provision 
is sweepingly broad and general in its terms, seemingly 
unlimited as to persons, property or damages involved, 
while the maintenance provision, on the other hand, is 
very specific, setting forth in detail the duty of the 
lessee to the lessor with reference to the leased premises. 
The specific maintenance provision sets forth with exac-
titude the property with which it is concerned, the degree 
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and extent of duty involved, and the exceptions to this 
duty. 
Unde-r the view vYhich the insurance company induced 
the trial court to adopt, paragraph 4 is an absolute 
nullity. It is as though it were never agreed upon and 
included in the lease by the parties at all. Under the 
insurance company's interpretation of the lease (to 
which it was not a party) the lessor could insure against 
any and all loss, damage or injury of any kind to the 
premises and upon payment of the claim by the insurance 
con1pany, it could hold the lessee absolutely liable, even 
for the causes specifically enumerated in the maintenance 
prOVlSlOll. 
This is an absurd result vvhich flies in the face of 
com1non sense and reason and does violence to the pri-
mary and fundamental rule that all parts of an instru-
ment will be given effect if possible. All that can be said 
for the rule espoused by the insurance company is that it 
'vould provide an unearned financial windfall for the 
insurance carrier which has already been paid the prem-
iunl it specified for the risk involved. We respectfully 
submit that this is insufficent justification for such a 
radical change in basic contract law. 
Although it is not essential to the proper disposition 
of the case, another rule of contract interp·retation used 
to reconcile conflicting provisions without going outside 
the instrument itself would also require a reversal. This 
is the frequently state·d rule that where two provisions 
conflict, the first one is given effect and the second 
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one gives way. Klever v. Klever, 333 Mich. 179, 52 
N.W.2d 653 (19·52) ; Burns v. Peters, 5 'Cal. 2d 619, 55 
p .2d 1182 ( 1936). 
In summary, it is the lessee's contention that a pro-
per construction of the lease, without recourse to out-
side evidence, precludes the conclusion that the lease 
imposes absolute liability on the lessee. 
POINT I. 
THE :TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE MO·-
TION OF THE INSURAN!CE ·COMPANY T'HAT, .AJS A MAT-
ER OF LAW, THE LEASE IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABIL-
ITY ON THE LESSEE: 
B. BEICAUSE GRANTING THE RULING R~E·QUES'T'ED 
BY 'THE INSURAN·CE COMPANY THAT THE 
LEASE IMPOSED ABSO,LUTE LIABILI'T'Y ON THE 
LESiSE:E AND THE CONSEQUENT LIMITING O~F 
THE ·TRIAL SOLELY TO THE QUESTION 0 1F DAM-
AGES PREJUDICIALLY PRECLUDED THE LES:SE;E 
FROM AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHO·W THE ACTUAL 
INTEN'T 0 1F THE PARTIES TO THE LEASE. 
Restricting the issues at trial, at the request of the 
insurance company, solely to the question of the amount 
of damages deprived the lessee of any opportunity to 
utilize two additional rules of contract interpretation 
which would have assisted in avoiding the error of hold-
ing that the lease imposed absolute liability on the lesseP. 
This court has ruled that where there is an ambiguity 
in a document, it is to be construed against the one ,vho 
wrote it. Gregerson v. Equit,able Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 
123 Utah 152, 256 p·.2d 566 (1953); Jordan v. Madsen, 69 
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Utah 112, 25·2 Pac. 570 (1926). 'This is also the restate-
ment rule. Restatement of Contracts, § 236(d). 
The insurance company thus led the trial court 
further into error by insisting that it exclude, which it 
did, evidence as to who drafted the lease. (R. 63) 
Another most important and fundamental rule in 
contract interpretation is that the parties own interpre-
tation of the instrument should be given great, if not 
conclusive, weight. Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah 108, 66 
Pac. 773 ( 1901). :The course of conduct of the insurance 
company led the trial court into the further error of 
excluding evidence of the interpretation of the parties 
to the instrument. (R. 63) 
Not only is the interpretation which the parties place 
on the instrument important, but also, as pointed out 
by this court, preliminary negotiations may show such 
intention. Thus in Fayter v. North, 30 Utah 15·6, 83 Pac. 
7 42 ( 1906) this court allowed extrinsic evidence as to 
"rhat the parties meant by "appurtenances" in a deed. 
In Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162, 44 Pac. 715 (1896) evi-
dence outside the lease \vas allowed to show what was 
meant by "reasonable use." 
The evidence and the offer of proof as to the inten-
tion of the parties was erroneously precluded to the 
prejudicial detriment of the lessee by the theory upon 
\Vhich the insurance company chose to try its case. (R. 
63) Had this evidence as to the intention of the parties 
been adn1itted, it \vould have given the trial court a basis 
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upon which to determine whether the parties to the lease 
really intended that there be absolute liability, something 
less than absolute liability, or whether it was not the 
intention of the lessor and lessee that the fire insurance 
purchased by the lessor with the proceeds from the rent 
inure to the benefit of both lessor and lessee, as is the 
generally accepted custom in the business for any other 
course of conduct allows the insurance company to collect 
twice for the same risk, or as here, collect once for the 
risk and then shift the burden it was fully paid to should-
er to one whose use of the premises provided the prem-
iums paid to the insurance carrier. 
It is with considerable trepidation that counsel 
for the lessee assert that research has failed to disclose 
competent authority supporting the position of the in-
surance company; however, research has failed to reveal 
a case where the lessor, let alone an insurance company 
fully paid to take the risk, has asserted, let alone pre-
vailed, on the theory inflicted by the insurance company 
upon the trial court below. 
We respectfully submit that the exclusion of the 
evidence as to who drafted the lease and the evidence as 
to the intention of the parties with reference to damage 
to the premises was prejudicial error. 
POINT II. 
THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF IN THIS 1CASE IS A 
REVERSAL WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO EN'TER JUDGMEN'T 
FOR THE LESSEE; HOWEVER, SHOULD THE COURT NOT 
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GRANT 'THIS RELIEF, A NEW TRIAL SHO·ULD BE OR-
DERED. 
The insurance company, plaintiff below, could have 
tried its case on more than one theory and on more than 
one issue. It chose not to do so. Over the objection of 
the lessee it chose to rest its entire case on the theory that 
the indemnity provision of the lease imposed absolute 
liability on the lessee and restricted the issues to be liti-
gated solely to the question of the amount of damages. 
'V e must assume that the insurance company stands 
upon the theory of absolute liability as the law of the 
case for it has not filed a statement of points as is re-
quired by rules 74(b) and 75(d) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for a cross appeal. Nor could it with propriety 
claim that the trial court erred in sustaining its wishes 
for as this court recently stated in Pettingill v. Perkins, 
2 Utah 2d 2i66, 272 P.2d 185 (19'54) at page 186, "lie can-
not lead the court into error and then be heard to com-
plain thereof. To permit such action would needlessly 
prolong litigation, so there n1ight never be :an .end 
thereto." Having elected voluntarily his position below 
"fie cannot now on appeal shift his theory and position." 
The the·ory on which this case was tried below, and 
its consequent posture on appeal, were determined by the 
insurance con1pany. Under the rule enunciated in Pet-
tingill v. Perkins, supra, that one "cannot lead the court 
into error and then be heard to complain thereof" the 
appropriate relief in this case is a reversal of the judg-
Jnent below and a remand "ri th instruction to enter judg-
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ment for the lessee. ·T·o do otherwse would unjustly 
penalize the lessee who was prepared to litigate all issues 
raised by the insurance company's complaint. It would 
allow the insurance company to try one theory, then 
another, and then yet another, ad infinitum, so that 
''there might never he an end thereto." 
Should the court, however, not grant the reversal and 
remand with instructions to enter judgment for the 
lessee, a new trial should be ordered. 
For simplicity of language the defendants-appel-
lants have been called by the singular "lessee." As shown, 
however, by the Notice of Appeal, this appeal is prose-
cuted for the benefit of Ballard-Wade, Inc., M. R. Ballard, 
Jr. and Loral R. Peterson. 
The appellants respectfully pray that this court re-
verse the judgment of the trial court and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment for the appellants, or in 
the alternative to remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARE.NCE 1C. NESLE.N and 
LEO A. JARDINE·, JR. 
NE,S·LE:N AND Mo,c·K 
1003 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake !City, Utah 
Attorneys for th.e 
Defendants-Appellants 
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